Edmunds AutoObserver Michelle Krebs, commenting on the termination and replacement of Cadillac’s leadership, concluded, “If GM is going to change and is going to succeed, it must change people.” Paraphrasing Eistein, she added that “Doing the same thing over and over again with the same people in the same positions and expecting a different result is…insane.”
Michelle Krebs is far from the first to suggest that, to survive, a struggling company must replace the executives that oversaw its decline. And she won’t be the last. But this is a superficial solution that, if it is the entire solution, will fail.
A key reason for the popularity of this solution is that it’s easy to observe and easy to comprehend. But it’s based on a very shaky assumption: if an executive didn’t achieve the desired result, then that executive either lacked ability or lacked the proper intent. The latter is addressed through demands for “accountability,” which Krebs also suggests.
But what if these are good, talented people placed in an unwinnable situation? What if the structure and culture of the organization prevent them from doing what they know should be done, and would otherwise do?
This has very much been the case within General Motors. I essentially lived within the GM organization for over a year back in the late 1990s, observing it as an anthropologist would. I encountered, over and over, people who knew the right thing to do, and who wanted to do the right thing, but who were unable to do it because GM’s structure and modes of operation placed endless barriers in their way. As a result, the predominating mood within the organization was one of frustration.
Putting different people in the same organization and expecting a different result is insane.
Actually, the outcome could well be different–but worse. Developiing and building cars in an intensely collaborative exercise. For people to do well within it they must both be experts at what they do and know those they work with very well. Place an expert among strangers, and they will likely discredit and ignore his or her suggestions. You cannot really know who knows what they’re talking about by listening to them for the first time. Knowledge of the extent of others’ knowledge, especially if they’re in a different field than you are, can often only be gained through repeatedly working together.
Bring in new people, and they will know neither their new jobs nor the expertise of those they must work with. This is proven recipe for either indecision or, when the pressure for results is intense, bad decisions. GM and many other companies have gone through this cycle over and over. While GM hasn’t often fired executives outright, as they did in this case, they’ve switched people around many times before, but rarely with the intended results.
Now, perhaps GM’s new leaders aren’t merely changing people. Perhaps they’re also making fundamental changes to the way the organization is structured and the way it operates. Maybe these changes simply aren’t being reported in the press because they are much more difficult to comprehend and communicate than personnel changes. Maybe they’re even the right structural and cultural changes. If so, then changing people might be necessary to keep the new organization from reverting to the old one. As one piece within a much larger solution, personnel changes might make sense.
But, if they’re the entire solution, personnel changes are bound to fail. To repeat: putting different people in the same organization and expecting a different result is insane.
The suggestions I offered to GM nearly a decade ago:
The implication: if the show were realistic, the family should be scared to death to be in a Toyota, and only placement dollars are keeping the show from replacing the Toyotas in question with truly safe cars. Overlooked: that even now the problem hasn’t been replicated or definitively identified, and at any rate affects a very small pecentage of cars. Anyone with a sense of probability would be no more concerned about driving a Toyota than any other car.
For the first model year, until a production line is set up in North America, the new Regal will be produced in Germany. Because the dollar remains weak compared to the euro, GM’s production costs will be high, and there is a clear need to price the car as high as possible. At the same time, it must be priced competitively, and not too close to the related but larger and more luxurious Buick LaCrosse.
Ford announced that the 2011 Mustang will be offered with two new DOHC engines that promise to cause major headaches for the Chevrolet Camaro and Dodge Challenger, a 305-horsepower 3.7-liter V6 and a 412-horsepower 5.0-liter V8. Yes, the 5.0 badges will be back. By nearly all accounts the 2010 Mustang already outhandles its primary competitors. Add nearly 100 horsepower to both of its volume engines, and it’ll run away from them in a straight line as well.
For 2012, we’ll once again be getting the same Focus Europe gets. The exterior design is a little busy, but much more stylish than Chevrolet’s upcoming Cruze and better proportioned than the smaller 2011 Ford Fiesta. Inside, you’ll find a very European interior with comfortable, supportive seats front and rear. Ford knows how to make a car handle well when they want to. The main question in my mind: will the new 155-horsepower 2.0-liter direct-injected four-cylinder engine be as good as the rest of the car? A sport model with a more powerful engine is likely.
